Ivan Us, Jim Mullinax, Grzegorz Stec, and Xu Qinduo on the Ukraine-US Minerals Deal, Critical Minerals, and Rebuilding Ukraine

Vita Golod

Hi everyone. My name is Vita Golod and I am co-founder of the Ukrainian Platform for Contemporary China, and currently a visiting adjunct instructor at UNC, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Just a quick reminder: we launched this platform in 2022, just a few months after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with the goal of fostering international dialogue between Ukraine and China and international experts on Ukraine's foreign policy, China's foreign policy, China-Ukrainian relations, and related global issues.

I am deeply grateful to today's panelists for joining us for this timely and important conversation on the recently signed mineral deal between Ukraine and the United States. My sincere thanks also go to Kaiser Kuo for his ongoing support. And I am especially pleased to announce that this event, along with the next three in the series, is supported by the Center for Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. It's exciting to note that the key takeaways from these discussions will be directly incorporated into an educational course offered here at UNC.

That's especially meaningful, because what Kaiser does with the Sinica podcast and what we do through the Ukrainian platform are grounded in real, practical conversations and discussions that students simply won't hear on Fox News or other media platforms. So once again I encourage you to follow both of these projects. We are committed to exploring critical global issues through international dialogue, bringing together voices from across regions, perspectives, and disciplines. Thank you, and enjoy the conversation today. The floor is yours.

Ivan Us

Thank you very much for the invitation. I will be glad to participate in the discussion.

Xu Qinduo

Thank you for having me.

Jim Mullinax

Yeah, it's really a pleasure to be here, Kaiser. Thank you.

Grzegorz Stec

Thanks a lot for the invitation, Kaiser.

Ivan Us

First of all, the prehistory of the question, because before October 2024 no one talked a lot about rare earth minerals in Ukraine; this topic was not so popular. But closer to October 2024, there was a clear understanding in Ukraine that, with high probability, in the US presidential election that was coming in November 2024, Donald Trump could win. And of course, in Ukraine we started thinking, taking into account Donald Trump's rhetoric that he did not plan to support Ukraine or give military aid to Ukraine — we started thinking that we needed to create something that could interest Donald Trump in that activity.

At approximately that period, the so-called victory plan of President Zelensky appeared, with several items, two of them directly oriented toward Donald Trump. The first thing that was interesting to Donald Trump was created with the co-authorship of Boris Johnson, a former prime minister of the United Kingdom. He proposed the idea that Ukrainian soldiers could in future substitute for US soldiers in the European bases. We now know that the United States plans to change the places where their soldiers currently sit in Europe, for another geographical direction — so, not to be in Europe. That's why the proposal to substitute US soldiers with Ukrainian soldiers was supported by Donald Trump.

But the second point, the one we are discussing now, was an idea developed with the co-authorship of the senator from the Republican party, Lindsey Graham. Graham proposed that if Ukraine put forward the idea of joint exploration of its resources, it would be very interesting to Donald Trump. And Ukraine, in this victory plan, said that we should have this deal, that we should think about how to cooperate in this area. After Donald Trump's first victory and then his inauguration, he really expressed his interest in this topic.

After that, it was something like a discussion between two sides, because from the Ukrainian perspective there should be a guarantee of US support for Ukraine in this war. We understand that without the United States it would be extremely hard for Europe to be with us. Yes, we have good relationships with European countries, and we have a good relationship with the second-largest NATO army, the Turkish army. But unfortunately their level of military production in Europe is not so high as in the United States. That's why we need them.

At that time we decided to use a philosophy: if you want to succeed in some case, you should make as many shareholders of your victory as you can, and then you receive that victory. So Ukraine decided to make the US a shareholder of our victory — meaning we proposed a deal about rare earths, saying that if the victory is in Ukrainian hands, the US can receive benefit from that victory. But over the first months of this discussion, the idea was that the Donald Trump administration wanted to see their benefits but did not want to have obligations. Furthermore, there was an idea at first that Ukraine should have some debt for previous aid that we received for free. That would undermine the basic rule in this world — that you cannot change the legislation to make it worse. You cannot say that something you received for free is now not for free, that you should pay for a thing you received for free.

Second, there was an idea that the US could receive a veto on our integration processes, and for Ukraine that was a big problem, because our main idea is to be in the European Union. We were afraid the United States could say that they don't think the European Union is a good partner, and forbid us to integrate into the European Union. Of course, for Ukraine, we could not accept that. And then there were talks about existing projects, and so on and so forth.

That's why, on the one hand, this deal was prepared up to the 28th of February. But on the 28th of February the whole world saw the clash in the Oval Office of the White House. It was not a fight — good — but it was a big scandal, and there was no signing of a deal. After that a lot of people thought it was the end of the story. But of course it was not, because the United States started to prepare its own version, even stricter than the previous one, and of course Ukraine did not agree with it. And Ukraine made a step: we invited lawyers from other countries to prepare a very good deal for both Ukraine and the US. Our position was simple — this deal should not be stopped by a court decision. If the court says it is a legal deal, that means there will be no deal at all. That's why we started working on it.

Furthermore, in parallel, the United States decided to undermine the global trade order when the increased tariffs practically put a full stop on the story of the World Trade Organization. At that moment, if everyone was reading the newspapers, they thought that the response of other countries to increased US tariffs would be a ban on giving rare earth minerals to the United States. In the US, a lot of media started to say that the United States needed to sign a deal with as many countries as it could regarding rare earth minerals, and Ukraine was like an example. So something like a deal with Ukraine — and of course it was a card in Ukrainian hands, because this deal was needed not so much for Ukraine, though of course it was needed for military aid, but it was needed for US interests to have such deals. That helped to return to normal dialogue.

Then there was a meeting between President Zelensky and Donald Trump — in the Vatican, where initially there should have been three members of the meeting, but we saw the video where the chair for Emmanuel Macron, the president of France, was eliminated: there were only two chairs. Several days after that discussion, Ukraine signed the deal. And immediately after signing the rare earth deal with the United States, we received, first, the unblocking of a $15 million deal for selling — not giving, but selling — weapons to Ukraine. Then there was a green light from the US administration for giving spare parts for F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine, which was important. Then there was information about a $350 million sale of weapons to Ukraine. And after that there was a green light for Israel to give its anti-rocket system to Ukraine. Plus there was a deal for the German producers of anti-rocket systems to give their technology to Ukraine using US technology — that's why they need approval from the United States.

Another moment: as I mentioned, the initiator of this idea was Lindsey Graham. Just after the signing of this memorandum, Lindsey Graham made a statement that he had prepared a draft law about 500% tariffs on the products of those countries buying products from Russia — oil, gas, and some other sources; not all products, but several. Everyone understands that these are very hard sanctions for Russia, because they demotivate other countries from having a deal with Russia. It doesn't mean this law will be accepted. Nevertheless, the fact that Lindsey Graham started to advertise this idea — we in Ukraine at least understand it is a reaction to this signing of the deal.

And now, more and more information appears. We now talk about 57 rare earth minerals in Ukrainian land, and we are not talking about current projects, we're talking about future projects. Of approximately 20,000 deposits of different rare earths in Ukraine, we have explored three and a half thousand of them. So we have a big field of work for the future — but it was very important for us to talk about the future, not about the past.

Jim Mullinax

Thanks for that really great question, Kaiser. Before I start, I just need to offer a little bit of a caveat. You mentioned I am a senior foreign service officer with the Department of State, currently on detail to the Wilson Center, where I write and research on economic security and economic statecraft issues. The remarks I'm making today are in my personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of State or the US government.

With that out of the way, let me respond. The agreement between the government of Ukraine and the government of the United States is really multi-purpose, understanding the importance of critical minerals to the United States and the potential Ukraine holds for being a source of critical minerals. I think it's really important to have a realistic perspective on what this agreement actually does. First of all, while we believe there are critical minerals available in Ukraine — as in many parts of the world — the geographic surveys that outline what's actually there date from the Soviet era. There haven't been any updated surveys for 30 or 40 years about what's available in Ukraine, in what quantities, where they are, what it might cost to get them out, the capital expenditures required, and so on. So there's a lot of work to be done to actually see real economic activity coming out of this agreement in the critical mineral space.

There are several reasons why it's important that the US wanted to sign this agreement. The first is obviously that we are looking for alternative sources for critical minerals. China does have a very large percentage of the global production of critical minerals, both in terms of the geographic distribution of the minerals and the mining operations, and an almost monopoly over a lot of the processing of these minerals. So it's in the US interest — and other countries as well, whether Europe or Japan or others — to have a diversified supply of these types of things. Ukraine could be a really interesting possibility for a source.

Ivan also mentioned the desire on the part of the Trump administration to find ways to recoup some of the money that has been spent providing weapons and other support to Ukraine during this war. The prospect of helping US companies to have a leg up in this market was very attractive to the Trump administration. As I said, the prospect of actually creating some of this economic activity is years away. But it does give US companies the right of first refusal for certain types of natural resource and infrastructure projects, and provides incentives through tax-free status. It pledges that the US will not impose any tariffs on imports of critical minerals or other mineral resources from Ukraine into the United States, which obviously is a big deal in the Trump administration.

Interestingly, it's not just critical minerals that are included in this deal — it's natural resources more broadly, including hydrocarbons. So there's a real possibility that the initial things we see coming out of Ukraine under this agreement might not be antimony or some other critical mineral, but maybe something like gas, or oil. Those types of things are also included in the deal, and we'll have to wait and see exactly how that works.

The other two things I'll mention quickly: from the US perspective, this is a really important way to send a message to Russia in particular that the US is very much committed to being engaged with Ukraine. That's an important message for Ukraine, obviously, and for our European partners to understand and hear. It's also important for the US to stand up and deliver. The second thing is that in the preamble to this agreement, both the Ukrainian side and the American side made a statement to the effect that it is their joint desire to see that those states and other persons who have acted to support aggression against Ukraine would not benefit from the reconstruction and economic activities in Ukraine once a peace agreement is in place. This is a way for the US and Ukraine to say very loudly: if you are against Ukrainian sovereignty, we want to put a stop sign up in terms of your future economic activities and benefit from the reconstruction of Ukraine when this war is over. We want the benefits to flow to others.

Jim Mullinax

I think you'd have to put China at the top of that list, and also Russia.

Jim Mullinax

No, I was just finishing up, and I think that's exactly the right analysis, the right conclusion to draw from that.

Grzegorz Stec

Thanks a lot, Kaiser. This deal is seen from the Brussels perspective as a bit of a mixed bag, because you have two competing priorities. From the European perspective, on one hand it's really about keeping the US involved in Ukraine, and more broadly within NATO and within Europe, for as long as we can, in order for us to proceed with our own defence spending and actually let it bear fruit. In that sense, getting some level of greater commitment and a positive signal from the Trump administration is obviously positive.

At the same time, as you point out, it is also a bit of an economic hurdle. Brussels — and generally speaking Europe — is now in the process of finding new, diversified sources of critical raw materials. This has been really on top of the agenda of the European Commission: last year we had the Critical Raw Materials Act, which puts forward specific goals that Europe has in that regard. So in that sense, yes, there is a big worry that the US will be a dominant force within Ukraine in that context. We also had a specific counter-offer, framed around more of a win-win approach, coming from the European side back in February, when things looked a little bit different in terms of the prospects of the deal between the US and Ukraine. So we see it in those two aspects at the same time.

More broadly, from the European perspective, we are now exactly at the moment where we are strongly dependent in the context of critical raw materials. This is something the European level has really come to realise: there have been specific analyses conducted by the European Commission in 2021 and 2022 analysing our dependencies. You had this entire push across the European system following COVID especially — where do we have dependencies, where do we have vulnerabilities, where are our choke points, what are the things we really need to work on — and of course critical raw materials are really on top of this.

In that context — as also in the context of Jim's response — yes, Brussels lives by the mantra of being country-agnostic, but there is a specific country at the top of that list. If you take a look at the broader picture: 73% of all cobalt in the world is mined in Congo, 69% of rare earth elements are mined in China, half of the global nickel supply is in Indonesia. That already puts it into a problematic category. But 98% of the rare earth elements imported into Europe come from China. There is a very clear dependence, and there was an acknowledgement that it is an issue.

It's also not an issue where we are acting simply on this estimation and the question of increased vulnerability. We had a case where this dependency was leveraged vis-à-vis Sweden, for example, in 2020-2021, where two types of graphite exports to Sweden from China effectively stopped, in the context of dynamics related to Huawei — Sweden banning Huawei being the context there, but also the competition in the battery sector coming from a Swedish company, Northvolt, which was the leading potential European competitor. So there are a lot of pieces here. And we are seeing all the investments coming from China into Europe, in Hungary especially, in the battery sector.

So there are a lot of moving pieces in terms of how the EU side would be evaluating that deal. Looking also at the fact that having the US more involved — yes, it's good. At the same time, we're increasingly evaluating the challenging relationship that I think we're going to have with Washington, at least for the next few years.

Xu Qinduo

Thank you, Kaiser. This is a good question, and a complex one. From the Chinese point of view, we see it, on one hand, as transactional. Obviously Kyiv is seeking US involvement, continuous US engagement, so as to ward off the Russian forces. They don't have cash to hand to Donald Trump, so they say, okay, here's a potential — because you care so much about mineral resources, the rare earths — we have rare earths here, although that is not a proven one. Remember there were maybe two surveys of mineral resources in Ukraine, and the data is in the hands of Moscow, not even in Kyiv. I don't think Donald Trump understands at all whether there is rare earth there, or how much. But anyway, it doesn't matter — this is from President Zelensky, the offer, to make it as attractive as possible to Donald Trump. Anyway, he did it. This is transactional, for the immediate purpose of course, the security for Ukraine. Understandable.

For the US side, of course, we understand the US wants to make sure that if there are any resources, the US has a hand on that, to make sure that in the future development — either it's US companies, or at least no Chinese companies — the US has a say in which companies will mine these resources and do business in Ukraine. In that sense, Beijing is not happy to see that, because we have globalisation, we have trade rules — you don't do that. Of course, it's up to the two countries, Ukraine and the US; they need each other in that sense, okay, fine.

But then there's a pattern that is concerning for Beijing. We call it a poison clause — basically it says Ukraine should not do business with China unless there's a green light from Washington. And if you take a look at the trade deal between Washington and London, there's also such a clause, saying that if you want to escape the steel export tariff, we have a say in who will own your steel plant — targeting China again. I don't know what kind of practice this is; I think this is troubling, to Beijing and probably to the global rules. What kind of rules are we following here? That is a big question.

And there's a concern that other countries, when they sign deals over tariffs with the United States — as reported in some media, the question from Washington is, what are you doing with Beijing, and what will you do with Beijing? Basically saying, you have to follow my rules in terms of conducting business with Beijing. This is the US way of attempting to maintain their primacy around the world, of course against China in their eyes as a competition. But obviously you can ask whether this is a fair competition — the competition as we understand it, or a new practice from Washington. In that sense, I think Beijing will do what it needs to do to protect its own interests.

Ivan Us

As our president said, first of all we need to invite US investors just to receive the security guarantee. And now we are talking about the future — it's not about current projects. It means that, first of all, after the end of the war — probably — this project could be realised. But the end of the war means the war should be won, and to win this war we need this support.

After that, of course, we were thinking about how to actually understand what we will be doing, because we talk a lot about this deal. The former deputy minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine, Olena Zerkal, said about half a year ago, when this idea appeared in October 2024, that to understand how much and what rare earth minerals we have in Ukraine, we need to make something like a research survey, and this research, by her estimation, will cost $25 million. So first we just need to understand what we are talking about, because now we have sold to the US a promise that they receive big rights in future projects. The US understands these rights: for the first 100 days of Donald Trump in office, it was a good reason for him to say he has a big achievement — he has this deal, and this deal can be copied by deals with other countries; it's the first of them. So politically we receive some benefits now. The question is how it will be realised in the future.

One of the ideas of this deal, which existed in Ukraine long before, concerns sources for the production of titanium. Before, Ukraine had ore for making titanium; this ore goes to Russia, Russia has manufacturing facilities to produce titanium, and then sells it to the United States, because they need titanium for their aircraft, for building civilian aerospace, and so on. In Ukraine we always said that we have the sources. The United States has an interest in this metal — so why do we need the third country that will produce it? We could organise it either in the United States or in Ukraine, and we do it without Russia. A large dependence on the Russian economy influences the course of the war of Russia against Ukraine, when a lot of countries could not impose sanctions against Russia due to that dependence. That's why now we see the problem in Europe, when they have an enormously big dependence on Russian gas, and we see how other countries try not to have the same dependence.

First of all, it's the destiny of the so-called Siberian stream — Power of Siberia 2 — because Russia wants to build it, and China says, no, we don't need this Siberia 2, because we have your share in our gas consumption, and if you want to sell more to us, do it according to your internal prices. Internal prices in Russia are at a very low level. So if Russia sells gas to China at local prices, it means they will not receive money for it, because it's subsidised — I mean the local prices. So we see that this dependence on Russian sources really creates a problem for Ukraine. That's why, in the case of titanium, we said: okay, let's think how to use our sources, and how the US can receive this titanium, but without the participation of Russia.

Ivan Us

Of course, yes, because the majority of the rare earth minerals are in territory not controlled by Ukraine — first of all the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and Crimea too. So it's something like a motivation for the United States: please help us to regain control of those territories. Yes, we hear the statement from Donald Trump that Ukraine should forget about Crimea, but Ukraine is not ready to forget about Crimea. Furthermore, there is a Black Sea regional relationship: the second army in NATO, Turkey, is extremely against giving Russia a chance to legitimise Crimea as their part, because Crimea is a big peninsula in the Black Sea region, and Turkey has historically competed with Russia for the Black Sea. They're not glad that Russia increased its opportunities in the Black Sea after annexing Crimea.

That's why we think there should be something to motivate the US to really help us return control over those territories, and this deal is something like that. In Ukraine, and in the financial world, there is a big joke: if you receive grants, which you should not return, it means people gave you money and want to forget about you. If they give you credit, which you should return, it means they believe in your victory. So Ukraine found something to interest the US, to make them believe in our victory and really help us get this victory. And after gaining control over the Donbas, this project about rare earth minerals will be realised — I mean new deposits, ones that were not exposed by Ukraine for the whole period after regaining independence up to 1991. So now, at least, there is motivation to help explore it.

Of course, it will be important in the process of rebuilding Ukraine, because after this full-scale war we need a lot of resources to rebuild everything. Even though we talk a lot about frozen Russian money, the material damage that Russia committed to Ukraine, as of August 2024, was estimated at $1 trillion 64 billion, and Russia has $300 billion in frozen assets. So it's not enough. Plus, in parallel, Syria also wants to have some part of Russian money for rebuilding. So we understand we should find something that really motivates people to invest in Ukraine, and this deal — especially exploring the deposits in the currently uncontrolled territory of Ukraine — is something that helps us in the future. So it's really a deal about future opportunity for Ukraine to receive US investment and money for the reconstruction period.

Jim Mullinax

That's a great question, Kaiser. Let me firstly touch on the capital contribution piece. While I'm not a lawyer and wasn't involved in the negotiations, I'll say that there are really good reasons to look at how the US is providing assistance to Ukraine, and the kinds of assistance it is providing, and for the Trump administration to see whether there are ways to recoup some of that money over the long term. As I said, this is a prospective agreement. Any real value that comes out of it to the United States, and also to Ukraine, will first need to wait until the end of the war, and secondly will take a considerable amount of time to come to fruition. So this is just a way for the US to ensure that it continues to have skin in the game as it moves forward, whatever happens in the peacetime framework that we all hope is coming soon to Ukraine.

With respect to the preamble of this agreement and the statement about being eager to ensure that the benefits that flow to Ukraine are flowing to them in ways that are not benefiting those who have acted against Ukraine's interests — let me say, I don't think this is just a US objective or preference. For many Ukrainians — and I don't want to speak for Ivan here — but for many Ukrainians I've spoken to over the past three or four years that I've been involved in conversations with Ukrainian counterparts, they are deeply concerned and upset by the support that China has provided to Russia over the past several years: providing dual-use goods, propping up Russia's economy in many ways, helping Russia to mitigate the impact of sanctions and export controls imposed by the United States, Europe, and partners around the world.

So, for Ukrainians as well as for Americans — and I would think as well for Europeans, though I won't want to speak for Greg — there are concerns about the Chinese, or others who have supported Russia's aggression in Ukraine, benefiting from the reconstruction. It's a bit galling. While this statement doesn't have the effect of law — it's not a legal prohibition against contracting with anybody in particular — I think there's a real preference to see that the benefits of any reconstruction flow to supporters of Ukraine, and not to those who've acted against Ukraine's interests.

Xu Qinduo

I see it as done with a dual purpose. On one hand, as leverage against the US crackdown on Chinese technology and Chinese exports. For example, the latest one — the US basically threatening every country in the world, don't use advanced chips produced in China, including the Huawei Ascend. That kind of practice is really standing out for a lot of people here. So that's a leverage: if the US continues to do something to hurt China, China has a leverage against the US practice.

Secondly, it's more like a negotiating tool in future talks between the two countries. Let's say, okay, let's walk back — China, if the US walks back from some of the restrictions and unfair practices, China will say, okay, we will walk back in terms of relaxing our control over mineral resources and rare earths. Otherwise, what do you have to negotiate with Washington? The practice from the Chinese side is that kowtowing to Washington is not a choice — you have to stand up against it. Trump is acting like a bully in the schoolyard, so you have to do a tit-for-tat kind of strategy against him. That's the dual purpose — keep a brick in your book bag, as it were, to use a Cultural Revolution-era phrase.

Xu Qinduo

Good question. I just want to respond first to what Jim has said. Jim again repeats what Washington and the West in general are saying — that China is helping Russia somehow against Ukraine. This is simply wrong, and they are trying to deepen such a concept. Of course this is against China, this competition between Washington and Beijing. I understand that. But look — I have a Russian colleague complaining to the Chinese side, oh, the Ukrainians are using Chinese drones on the battlefield killing Russian soldiers. Is China providing weapons to the Ukrainian side, or to the Russian side? It's a market. The DJI drones — the belief is they were bought by Poland and then transferred to Ukraine. It's a market economy, with a lot of players; I don't think Beijing can control all the players over there.

So Beijing is not exactly siding with Russia against Ukraine. Let me make it really plain: Beijing is siding with Russia against the US, because the US is pressuring, is cornering, both Russia and China. So they choose to stay together, simply against the United States — not against Ukraine at all, at least for Beijing. Beijing suffered a huge loss because of this war, because Beijing was not prepared for the Russian invasion, and a lot of investment under the Belt and Road Initiative, a lot of construction projects in Ukraine. I would say the Chinese companies would be more than happy to help, if the war stops, with whatever projects in Ukraine. China is probably the only country with the capacity, the ability, the tools, the technology, the machines to rebuild the nation as quickly as possible. I don't think the US companies are in a position to do that at all. Despite the US insisting on having a say in the future business operations in Ukraine, this is for the immediate, near-term purpose of having the US engaged to support Ukraine. But look — after the mineral deal was signed, the war is going on, the Russians continue bombing the Ukrainians. If there's a purpose, is that purpose being achieved? I think people should raise that question. Obviously, it failed.

Grzegorz Stec

Thanks a lot, Kaiser. Responding from the European side, obviously we hope that the future of Ukraine is a European one, within our common family, within the EU. But allow me first to quickly comment on the points raised so far, if I can.

When it comes to China's support for Russia, I strongly invite everyone — if I'm allowed to drop the name of one project — to look at the China-Russia dashboard we have been working on, together with colleagues from OSW in Poland and from the Swedish China knowledge centre, which provides in graphs hard data on what we know about the China-Russia relationship since the beginning of the war and how it has been coming together. I strongly invite everyone to give it a look, because I do think we are seeing this relationship coming closer, also in the context of increasing cooperation in the military sphere. This is something where the concern on the European side is really considerable. Even aside from Ukraine as such, the assessment on the European side is that once — whatever the conclusion of the Russian invasion is — Russia is going to probably rearm and take another action, and we are worried about the position China would take under such circumstances. So this is a wider question for Europe beyond just China's role in the context of Ukraine.

Quickly on the topic of rebuilding: to my mind we land somewhere in the middle. Yes, indeed, the financial needs of this kind of reconstruction would be so high that in many cases China is the viable option, simply in the context of the cost of processing such reconstruction. At the same time, there are big concerns about which sectors China would participate in, because we are all progressing with our assessment of China's involvement in critical infrastructure in Europe. As we're talking about the prospects of increased Ukrainian integration into the EU, there would be concerns about whether the usage, for example, of some Chinese telecom providers would be aligned with the guidelines and norms we're setting up for ourselves within the EU. So this is really a mixed picture, where there is no clear all-in or all-out response on Chinese participation.

But turning to your original question — sorry for the detour — from the European perspective, the approach we have been seeing from the US has been to a large extent driven by national security concerns. You also see that the US relies on the Defense Production Act in the context of collaboration with Australia on critical raw materials. So we see that angle. We have a slightly different angle, one that comes more from trying to build open strategic autonomy, trying to ensure that we address our vulnerabilities and over-dependencies. In many regards, the kind of deals the EU is trying to make over critical raw materials — as it has with Australia, Kazakhstan, Serbia, under the umbrella of the Global Gateway, the kind of reaction that Europe has to the Belt and Road Initiative — they still have a very strong sustainability requirement aspect to them. In a way that's a problem, because this is exactly what we're good at: as the EU, we are the institutionalists, the globalists, the regulators in the room, and we are now learning to operate in this much more geopolitical, unilateral, fast-moving environment. That's part of the problem, because the US also comes with much more funding, which is something we still struggle with. We come with very good frameworks and are now trying to fill them with financing, where the support from the European Commission, in cooperation with member states and banks, should be able to channel more private funding into it. We'll see how this ends up going.

Very quickly on the US-EU interactions in that space: I think Ukraine is part of it. We also have to remember Greenland, toward which President Trump has voiced some ideas, let's put it that way. In 2023, according to European Commission surveys, 25 out of 34 critical raw materials we've defined are present in Greenland. So the critical raw materials question also applies to a large extent to the relationship between the US and the EU in the context of Greenland. But it's not just to say, oh my god, we're on a collision course here, there's no way to navigate that. If we take a look, for example, at what the EU is doing in Romania, where there's a very big investment in magnesium mining, it's done together with a private investor from the US. It's also an investment seeking to create the processing that would feature aluminium outputs that would be up to 9% of global demand. So we can do things together — we're already together in the Mineral Security Partnership. There are things we can still do together. The key question is that right now we're not necessarily in the best political dynamic. We don't have a clear indication of where the US wants to take our relationship, or what the actual demands are, and it has been hard for the European counterparts to reach out to Washington, to get the meetings, to discuss the details and proposals. So in that sense it's a mixed bag. But also in the context of Ukraine, I think it's a question of modalities, because from the European side the interest in supporting Ukraine is not going away — because Ukraine is Europe. In that sense, this is not going to change.

Ivan Us

Of course, before signing this deal, we discussed a lot with lawyers. It's not a secret that our government and the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine invited several US law companies, and they said that this article will not contradict your integration path, and that it cannot create a big problem. Of course, we understand that something should be interesting to the United States for investing in this new project. But first of all, as I said, it's very important that we're talking about a future one, not an existing one — a future that may be after Donald Trump is out of office.

A lot of people say Ukraine needs this deal now to receive US support; if something creates a problem, we can rediscuss it — probably it will not be Donald Trump, it will be the next president, because after his four-year term, it will be — who knows. Of course he jokes about a third term, but I don't think it's serious, and I'm not sure Congress would give Donald Trump a green light to be re-elected for a third term, because after Franklin Roosevelt there was no president for more than two terms. Nevertheless, I think this question could be discussed after his presidency, or I think we can find a good solution, because we need investment from the United States.

I think it should be decided in a trialogue between the EU, Ukraine, and the United States, because in Ukraine we couldn't say when we will actually be in the EU — but at least the most optimistic assessment is 2030, so only five years, probably more than five years. Nevertheless, if Ukraine will be an EU country, of course it means the EU should be present in all talks, as it is Ukraine's future territory, and then we resolve all the controversial moments that could be created in this deal. But even now some lawyers are talking about the moment that Ukraine signs this deal at a time when we are under the big pressure of war — when there will be no war, we will see what will happen. Of course, Ukraine, I try to emphasise, is interested in receiving investment from the US, and investment in rare earth minerals too.

Xu Qinduo

I think so. It's a double-edged sword. If you look at the US tariff, it's the same, right? The US imposes it on the rest of the world, and then you lose credibility, you lose the goodwill from people from the rest of the world. People say, hey, the US is no longer the country we used to know, it's not reliable, and then people will find a way to distance themselves from the US or reduce reliance on the US. So China, if they are not careful, could land in a similar position in terms of mineral resources. One example is the 2010 case. China, I would say, mismanaged its rare earth — I still remember it limited the export to Japan, and that spurred the effort to rely more on themselves in terms of rare earth. So this is a good lesson.

I think China should be as specific as possible, as narrow as possible. For example, you could target the US arms or ammunition companies. Say, okay, if you sell weapons to Taiwan — that's a core interest of China — we will limit the rare earth export to such companies.

Xu Qinduo

Yes. I think China should publicise it more, to make it clear that it's not a threat to European countries, not a threat to other countries in the Global South, for example. Of course, this is related to a larger topic — we call it over-dependence, or the de-risking policy from European countries. China has no problem with European countries, or with Global South countries, using the processing technology and processed mineral resources from China. China is the largest trading partner of more than 120, in some cases more than 140, economies around the world. China is promoting globalisation, because globalisation is in the interest of the Chinese side. But in response to the US tariff wall, the Chinese side will do what it can, and that is the use of rare earth — but not targeting European countries.

Of course, if they say we want to reduce reliance on the Chinese side, that's their own sovereign decision. There's little Beijing can do, in addition to probably trying to persuade them: okay, we are good partners, we would like to continue to be your partner. But ultimately, it's like in the Ukraine crisis — I think we should respect the sovereignty of the Ukrainians, of Ukraine as a country, as a nation. They will do whatever they like for the benefit and interest of their own nation, and I don't think Washington should somehow rob Ukraine of who they will do business with in the future. That's simply unfair.

Jim Mullinax

I appreciate the historical context here, but I'll also say that this type of production is going to require a lot of investment. And it's going to require a lot of stability and certainty that is very much absent right now. Trying to create a framework that will encourage companies to do the heavy and expensive work in the near term of exploring for these minerals, doing the land surveys, the geological surveys that need to be undertaken, and then thinking through how to actually exploit these resources to the extent they are able to do so in ways that are economically viable — having that framework established early is going to attract a lot more interest and a lot more investment. We all hope. That's certainly the US side's hope, and I think that's the Ukrainian side's hope as well.

To the point about carving it off or creating some sort of extraterritoriality — the agreement doesn't say that the US gets a better deal than anybody else. This agreement says that any deal the Ukrainians come up with, the US should have the opportunity to make the first pitch at it. And if US firms are not interested in doing so, other firms can do those deals on the same terms. If the Ukrainian side wants to provide better terms, the US side would like to have a chance to participate on those terms, if it's in our interest. So I don't see necessarily that this is a form of extraterritoriality, or somehow carving out exemptions from the law. It's just trying to create some sort of stability of expectations, and saying, hey, if there's going to be a deal, the US wants to be able to have the best terms that anybody else is going to be able to get.

Grzegorz Stec

Thanks. From the European perspective, one of the important things is not to put the cart before the horse. We need to ensure that Ukraine actually manages to win the war on terms favourable to Ukraine. In that sense, yes, the deal reached between the US and Ukraine is a particular case, because it's a way of trying to incentivise greater commitment from the new administration in Washington, and in that sense it's highly relevant. But much of the discussion we're currently having in Brussels is primarily about how to ensure that Ukraine can prevail and win in response to the Russian invasion.

At the same time, there are a number of instruments that could be used on the European side. We already have the eastern neighbourhood instrument that has been relevant for the countries in the region. So, putting simply more, and pulling more investment funds on the side of Europe into that space, could be one of the options. Leveraging the Global Gateway and targeting it more toward development projects in Ukraine could be another way — of course, keeping in mind that any kind of development support right now is in short supply globally, partially thanks to changes introduced by the Trump administration, but it becomes a wider trend globally. So it's going to be a very big question from the European side, of course, how we're going to navigate that. But right now, again, the priority for Europe is ensuring also its own security. So those are the key aspects at the top of the agenda right now.

Xu Qinduo

First of all, China is not looking for a war, even a war of words, with the United States. What China is doing is really to protect its own interests against a multi-front offensive from Washington. Secondly, what is slightly different from what happened 100 years ago — in China we call it the humiliation period, when Western powers pressured the Chinese side, when it was really weak, like today's Ukraine, to sign these unequal treaties, conceding rights to foreign powers, like today's Ukraine — what's slightly different is that Ukraine needs the US right now: it needs US weapons, needs US support politically and diplomatically. So it's a bit different.

For China, China would say it practises the principle of respecting the sovereign decision, the sovereignty, of Ukraine. It's a sovereign decision, the plan presented by President Zelensky. Many people would say President Zelensky is really smart, wise, and skilled in terms of, let's say, manoeuvring Donald Trump into believing there's a huge potential and then ultimately signing the deal. So in that sense China would say, okay, that's between Washington and Kyiv, we understand that, but we'll leave that alone. I think that's probably what's behind it.

Ivan Us

First of all, thank you for the invitation, a really very interesting discussion. I think the topic of rare earth minerals — half a year ago no one talked about it at all, and now I think it's one of the main topics. I think our discussion was interesting, and that's why I want to thank all the spectators of our video. I think they found something interesting in this talk. Thank you very much to all.

Jim Mullinax

Thanks, Kaiser. I'll just make two really quick points, or maybe re-emphasise some things I said earlier. Number one: the Ukraine-US critical minerals deal is really about multiple things. It's about potentially critical minerals in Ukraine, but more importantly it's about demonstrating that the US is committed to Ukraine and has skin in the game. That's the message I hope people will take away from this deal — that the US wants to support Ukraine, and this is a way for us, over the long term, to really demonstrate that we're going to be there.

Secondly, on the idea of critical minerals more broadly: with respect to Ivan, we've actually been talking about this for quite some time now, really since 2010 and beyond. The issue of dependence on certain countries, particularly China, for critical minerals — but not only China — is something that has occupied a lot of policymakers in the United States, through the Obama administration, the first Trump administration, Biden, and now the second Trump administration. Through the course of all those discussions over the last 10 to 15 years, a few key principles have been a throughline. Among those is that diversification is really important, because we don't want to be too reliant on any one source for critical minerals — particularly for our national security, but also for our economic security, because, as you noted at the top, they are useful in so many different items that are part of our shared economic future.

So finding ways to work together with like-minded partners and allies to diversify our supplies and our ability to process critical minerals is really crucial. We have been doing that through the Mineral Security Partnership that Greg mentioned earlier, and through other mechanisms — bringing Ukraine into that process, looking for opportunities to work together with Ukraine and other partners to diversify our critical minerals resources in the global market. This is the kind of thing where we need to be working together closely with the Europeans, the Australians, the Canadians, and others who share our concerns about dependence for these types of minerals.

Jim Mullinax

It's a really good question, Kaiser, and I don't want to necessarily commit the administration to anything.

Jim Mullinax

So, this is just Jim Mullinax talking — my own personal view is that the United States has a very strong interest in seeing a free and sovereign Ukraine, ideally with its original territorial borders. What it finally looks like, I don't know — that's up to the Ukrainians and, presumably, the Russians to work out in the end, in a final peace agreement, which we all hope is coming soon. The US, in my view, needs to be supporting Ukrainian sovereignty. And I'm very glad that the Trump administration has taken steps to demonstrate that they want to have skin in the game. The vice president has said this, the president has said this. Having skin in the game is going to, hopefully, encourage the US to stay the course in Ukraine — whatever staying the course means — but to be invested long-term in Ukrainian sovereignty.

Jim Mullinax

Many things have been said.

Grzegorz Stec

Thanks a lot, Kaiser. First of all, if we zoom out from the situation right now, it's really about the change, going from a kind of commitment to globalisation, institutionalism, and a values-based approach, toward a more security-minded, transactional-minded world. I think this is exactly what we're seeing in the context of the critical raw materials deal as well. This is a new environment, in a way, for some of the actors, especially for the EU, to navigate — something the EU is learning quite rapidly, but not necessarily something it was geared toward from the beginning.

So what we have ahead of us, in the context of the more challenging moment in transatlantic relations, is that we need to have some tough conversations ahead of us, but ones that are hopefully going to be very productive and will find a new way forward, including in the context of what it means for EU-China relations. At the same moment, there has been quite some momentum of engagement that, supposedly, the challenging moment in transatlantic relations opens up. A lot of the concerns that Europe has vis-à-vis China — whether that's the China-Russia relationship, the question of overcapacity or overinvestment on the Chinese side, or indeed the question of our vision of the international order — all of those issues remain, and we have to keep the conversation going, also with our Chinese partners. But it is not really a moment in which we're having a simple either/or option on the European side. We're really in a situation where boosting and working on our strategic autonomy — understood again as addressing our vulnerabilities — is the way to go, and doing that whenever we can with partners, but keeping in mind the complexity that we're all venturing into.

Ivan Us

Of course, weapons are probably the priority, just because we are at war. As for non-weapon investment, I think it could be anything, because it much depends on the way of rebuilding Ukraine — if it will be a so-called Marshall Plan 2.0. I mean supporting Ukraine like the US supported Europe after the end of the Second World War, just to give new momentum to the world economy at that time. Now, after the stresses of COVID and after the full-scale war in Ukraine, I think new areas in the economy can open.

In Ukraine, it would largely be close to food production, because even in time of war Ukraine remained the main world exporter of sunflower oil and some other products. So I think there could be investment in this area. Plus, we know that after the first steps to reconstruct Ukraine, several European countries have started to invest in separate regions. For example, we have a good dialogue between the Mykolaiv region and Denmark — Denmark is now thinking about investment in this area. So these are probably new businesses that will be interesting to investors, because they are opening Ukraine for themselves. So it's quite possible that there will be investment. Thank you for the question.

Xu Qinduo

I would say that what we are seeing — the changes, the mineral resources agreement between Ukraine and the US — is the result of the change of government in Washington, a change of US policy. Jim has said that the US is committed to Ukraine. Obviously, it's not. For Donald Trump, he prefers a closer relationship with Russia rather than with European countries, rather than with Ukraine. Because of that change, Ukraine has to do something to make sure the US will stay in the game. That's why we have this mineral resources agreement. And also why Brussels and European countries are forced to be truly autonomous, to de-risk from Washington in terms of security, in terms of over-dependence — even ideologically depending on Washington. So it's a good thing, maybe long-term. But for the short term, or the medium term, we are probably seeing this kind of chaos and uncertainty in many respects.